This paper begins with some observations about the theoretical difficulty of determining the sense in which values exist. For modes of thinking influenced by the fact/value distinction, values are often defined as in some sense unreal. Such observations have recently been used to trouble notions of culture as a key organizing feature of social life. I argue here that for those who do not want to rely on models in which cultures mechanically supply values, it might be argued that values exist in the form of socially concrete exemplars or exemplary actions. In making this argument, I define exemplars as representations that model the realization of single values in unusually full form – forms that are not common in daily life because most actions are driven by a mix of diverse value considerations. Having established this theoretical framework, I go on to make the further argument that some persons and rituals are key social forms in which exemplary representations of values are made socially available to people. I illustrate this argument by analyzing several persons and rituals that are important among the Urapmin of Papua New Guinea. The overall aim of the paper is both to contribute to theoretical discussions about the nature of value and to explore with some precision the role of exemplars in social process.